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ABSTRACT 
Software Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN or SDWAN) is a modern conception            
and an attractive trend in network technologies. SD-WAN is defined as a specific             
application of software-defined networking (SDN) to WAN connections. There is growing           
recognition that SDN and SD-WAN technologies not only expand features, but also            
expose new vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, at the present time, most vendors say that            
SD-WAN are perfectly safe, hardened, and fully protected. 
The goal of this paper is to understand SD-WAN threats using practical approach. We              
describe basic SD-WAN features and components, investigate an attack surface, explore           
various vendor features and their security, explain threats and vulnerabilities found in            
SD-WAN products. We also extend existing SDN threat models by describing new            
potential threats and attack vectors, provide examples, and consider high-level approaches           
for their mitigations. The provided results may be used by SD-WAN developers as a part               
of Secure Software Development Life Cycle (SSDLC), security researchers for penetration           
testing and vulnerability assessment, system integrators for secure design of SD-WAN           
solutions, and finally customers for secure deployment operations and configurations of           
SD-WAN enabled network.  
The main idea of this work is that SD-WAN threat model involves all traditional              
network and SDN threats, as well as new product-specific threats, appended by vendors             
which reinvent or introduce proprietary technologies immature from a security perspective. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and Privacy → Distributed systems security; ​Security protocols; • Networks →             
Cloud Computing; Wide area networks  
KEYWORDS 
SDN, SD-WAN, NFV, security, cybersecurity, threat intelligence, threat modelling 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 1 
CCS CONCEPTS 1 
KEYWORDS 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 
1    INTRODUCTION 2 
Approach Overview 4 
Contributions 4 
Related Work 4 
Organization of the Article 5 
Terms and Definitions 5 
2    SD-WAN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 6 
SD-WAN Components 6 
SD-WAN Component Implementation 9 
3    UNDERSTANDING SD-WAN THREATS 10 
Outdated Software Threat 10 
IPMI Threats 11 
Packet Processing Threats 12 
Network Functions Virtualization Threats 14 
Management Threats 16 
Command Line Interface 17 
Web User Interface 17 
Multi-tenancy 18 
Orchestration Threats 19 
Service Interface 19 
 Zero Touch Provisioning 20 
Cryptography Threats 21 
4    CONCLUSIONS 22 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 23 
REFERENCES 23 
 
1    INTRODUCTION 
The software defined wide-area network is a technology based on SDN approach applied             
to WAN connections in Enterprises. According to Gartner's predictions, more than 50% of             
routers will be replaced with SD-WAN solutions by 2020 but community knowledge on             
SD-WAN threats and attacks is limited. 
New systems and components deployed in networks to carry out SD-WAN functions            
may become a target of attack and compromise network security of all organisations. By              
definition, an SD-WAN system forms network perimeter and connects Internet, WAN,           
extranet, and branches that makes it attractive targets for attackers. SD-WAN can have             
firewalls, DPI, VPN, malware detection and other traditional security features on board            
which is crucial from a cybersecurity point of view. 
Previous works [1 - 6] focus on general SDN technology or Virtual Networks             
Functions (VNF) threats and attack surface. The goal of this paper is to highlight practical               
aspects of SD-WAN threat modeling applied to real-world well-known products.  
We explored the most widespread and popular SD-WAN products employed in           
enterprise and corporate networks. Table 1 lists SD-WAN vendors and products we            
examined in our research. Versa, Citrix, and Cisco products were deployed locally. The             
other products were deployed on AWS infrastructure. 
 
Table 1. Explored SD-WAN Vendors and Products 
Vendor Products 
Versa Networks Analytics 
FlexVNF 
Director 
Citrix NetScaler SD-WAN Center 
NetScaler SD-WAN (SD-WAN)  
Talari Cloud Appliance 
Viprinet Virtual VPN Hub 
Silver Peak Unity Orchestrator 
Unity EdgeConnect 
Riverbed SteelConnect 
SteelHead 
Cisco (Viptela) vManage 
vBond 
vSmart 
vEdge 
Approach Overview 
Our approach is based on the following international standards and best practices: 
1. Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Testing Guide. 
2. Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES). 
3. NIST Special Publications 800-115 Technical Guide to Information Security         
Testing and Assessment. 
4. Center for Internet Security (CIS) standards. 
We basically reviewed product documents (data sheets, configuration and operation          
guides, slides, etc.) and reference specifications manually and tested real systems in simple             
scenarios.  
The steps we employed to identify threats, security weaknesses, and potential           
vulnerabilities for each SD-WAN product are as follows: 
1. The product documentation and specification reviewing. 
2. The product deployment. As a rule, we deployed a network consisting of two             
branch offices connected by several WAN links. That testbed enabled us to send             
network packets over the network. 
3. Software decomposition and inventory. 
4. Entry points, interfaces and protocols enumeration. 
5. Information leakage analysis and fingerprinting. 
6. Operating system hardening measure and mechanism analysis. 
7. Security feature investigation and analysis. 
8. Multi-tenancy analysis. 
9. Security assessment within penetration testing approach for some components and          
functional blocks. 
10. Threat modeling, documenting, and responsible disclosure. 
It should be noted that we did not use the above steps for all the SD-WAN products                 
from the scope due to limited resources. In some cases we confined ourselves to              
management plane security analysis. 
Contributions 
The contributions of the paper include the following: 
1. A taxonomic threat modelling approach for SD-WAN systems. 
2. A practical SD-WAN system threat model extending the previous SDN threat           
models within practical aspects. 
This approach allowed us to uncover multiple design flaws, security issues, weaknesses,            
and zero-day vulnerabilities in the SD-WAN products. 
Related Work 
Yoon et al. [1] conduct a comprehensive survey of possible methods for abuse or              
exploitation of an SDN stack based on OpenFlow, create a basic SDN attack surface,              
provide a generalized classification of attack vectors for abuse or direct attack on SDN.              
However, they consider only control and data plane attack surfaces and do not analyse              
management and orchestration planes at all. 
Several research papers provide theoretical reports related to SDN threats. Hizver [2]            
tries to systematically identify SDN threats. He enumerates threat sources, vulnerability           
sources, threat actions and then describes the integrated SDN threat model. At the same              
time that work is theoretical and does not provide any real examples of vulnerabilities or               
attacks on SDN. Moreover, the report provides common attacks that are specific not for              
SDN, but for general computer systems. The following examples were described:           
disruption of service using flooding attacks, unauthorized access using password          
brute-forcing or password-guessing attacks, unauthorized access using remote application         
exploitation attacks, etc. The same approach is applied in [3]. They focus on             
container-based virtualization approach and consider Container-as-a-Service platform for        
SDN within NVFI architecture. The report also analyses security threats and provides            
mitigation strategies to secure VNFs. 
Shankar [4] describes critical security threats that exist in the NFVI and proposes best              
common security practices to be protected against them. The following high-level methods            
are considered: VNF image signing, kernel hardening, remote attestation, isolation, secure           
booting, etc. It should be pointed out that we have not found an SD-WAN product               
implementing those proposed methods. 
Rajendran [5] focuses on security analysis of Nuage VNS solution. He describes the             
attack surface and security weaknesses that were found in Nuage VNS product. He also              
discloses vulnerabilities in the CPE zero-touch provisioning implementation and         
demonstrates some man-in-the-middle attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities. 
The Verizon SDN-NFV Reference Architecture [6] provides 8 layers of threat vectors            
associated with securely delivering a service in a network based on SDN, NFV and              
Virtualization. That document provides common requirements and basic recommendations         
regarding secure communication, authentication, audit, etc. The Verizon Reference         
Architecture contains common and highly useful recommendations that are not used and            
followed by vendors, as we will see below. 
Organization of the Article 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 considers SD-WAN             
architecture, design principles, and the main components. We also discuss common           
approaches to software implementation and open source reuse. Section 3 addresses threat            
enumeration for SD-WAN. We describe most frequent threats and provide examples of            
found vulnerabilities and possible attacks. The main results are given in Section 4. 
Terms and Definitions 
For the purposes of the article, we will use the main terms and definitions of documents [6                 
- 8]. 
2    SD-WAN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW  
SD-WAN Components 
SD-WAN enables new implementation of the planes and its functions on the SDN-NFV             
infrastructure specific to WAN which provides additional features for customers, such as:  
● Multi-tenancy (VRF and routing) 
● Zero-touch provisioning 
● Overlay and dynamic tunneling VPN  
● WAN optimization 
● Intelligent path selection and route learning 
● Automatic bandwidth detection 
● Service chaining 
● Security services such as VPN, NGFW, WAF, URL categorization and filtering,           
DPI/IDPS, SSL/TLS inspection 
 
To fully understand SD-WAN threats an understanding of overall architecture,           
component interconnection patterns, typical control and data flows is required. Any of            
these can contain vulnerabilities and be exploited by attackers to compromise an enterprise             
network. Figure 1 illustrates a general SD-WAN architecture and its building blocks. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. SD-WAN basic logical architecture and flow 
 
 
Based on the SDN-NFV reference architectures [6 - 8], the following main functional             
blocks were identified in SD-WAN:  
● Network Function (NF): functional block within a network infrastructure that has           
well-defined external interfaces and well-defined functional behavior. 
● Network Service (NS): composition of Network Functions defined by its functional           
and behavioural specification. 
● Virtualized Network Function(VNF): implementation of an NF that can be          
deployed on a Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure (NFVI). The         
following are examples of VNFs: DPI, IDPS, WAF, LB, NAT, PROXY, and VPN. 
● NFV Infrastructure (NFVI): hardware and software in which VNFs are deployed. 
● Network Controller (CTRL): functional block that centralizes some or all of the            
control and management functionality of a network domain and provides an           
abstract view of its domain to other functional blocks via well-defined interfaces. 
● Network Functions Virtualisation Orchestrator (NFVO): functional block       
responsible for the management of the NS life cycle, VNF lifecycle and NFV             
infrastructure resources. 
● Network Functions Virtualisation Infrastructure Node (NFVI-Node): physical       
device(s) deployed and managed as a single entity, providing the NFVI Functions            
required to support the execution environment for VNFs. 
● Network Service: composition of Network Function(s) and/or Network Service(s),         
defined by its functional and behavioural specification. 
● VNF Manager (VNFM): functional block that is responsible for the lifecycle           
management of  VNF. 
● Network Element (NE): group of data plane resources that is managed as a single              
entity. Network element, router and edge router terms are used interchangeably.  
● Management interface (MGI): functional block that is responsible for accessing          
and governing a set of resources and functions. 
● Multi-tenancy: feature where physical,virtual or service resources are allocated in          
such a way that multiple tenants and their computations and data are isolated from              
and inaccessible by each another 
● Tenant: one or more SDN-NFV service users sharing access to a set of physical,              
virtual or service resources  
 
SD-WAN system implementation is not always based on a hierarchical model from a             
network topology point of view (Figure 2). For example, controller and orchestrator can be              
deployed in the same IP network or broadcast domain. This can allow an attacker to               
perform vertical access control attacks and access management interfaces and functions. 
 
 
Figure 2. SD-WAN testbed network topology example 
 
Different SD-WAN components, in turn, can have their own internal structure. For            
instance, a VNF may consist of one or multiple components, called VNFC [7]. A VNFC,               
in this case, is a software entity deployed as a virtual machine or container. At the same                 
time, a VNF is managed as a single element even if it is implemented by a set of VNFC.                   
Having said this, a separated internal network can be employed inside an SD-WAN             
component (Figure 3). This network provides VNFC connectivity and can process           
East-West traffic using sophisticated load balancing or failover algorithms. Those and           
other design statements should be addressed within threat modelling. 
 
 
Figure 3. The example of SD-WAN Network Element with VNF support 
 
SD-WAN Component Implementation 
From a software engineering perspective, SD-WAN components, such as Orchestrator,          
Controller or Network Element can be built on different open-source and proprietary            
software. We enumerate the main software components and their implementation, we have            
seen in the analyzed SD-WAN products, in Table 2. 
 
  Table 2. SD-WAN software component examples 
Component Software 
 
Virtualization 
Virtualization OpenStack, KVM, Docker 
Network services 
Packet processing DPDK 
Proxy HAproxy 
Routing Bird, Quagga 
Service discovery Avahi 
Northbound protocols NETCONF, REST, XMPP 
Southbound protocols OpenFlow, OMP, MP-BGP, BGP, custom proprietary 
protocols 
Data plane VXLAN, GRE, MPLS, AH/ESP, TLS, DTLS 
Management services 
SQL database MySQL, MariaDB, PostgreSQL 
NoSQL database ElasticSearch, Cassandra, OrientDB, Apache Solr 
Message broker Apache Kafka 
Web server Apache, Nginx 
Web application server Apache Tomcat, Karaf, WildFly, Node.js 
Web framework Django, CakePHP 
Cache Redis 
Resource monitoring Munin 
Remote management AjaxTerm, OpenSSH, Shell In A Box 
Front-end Angular, ExtJS 
Security Services 
Encryption strongSwan 
Firewall netfilter/iptables 
Web application firewall Modsecurity, OWASP CRS rules 
IDPS Snort, suricata. ET Pro rules 
DPI Qosmos ixEngine 
Filtering and classification MaxMind, BrightCloud, Cyren services  
Anti-virus Cyren engine 
DNS security Farsight  database 
System Software 
Operating system Ubuntu, Debian, custom distributive 
3    UNDERSTANDING SD-WAN THREATS 
This section considers security threats related to the main SD-WAN functional blocks            
and components. 
Outdated Software  
In general, operating systems used in SD-WAN nodes (edge router, controller,           
orchestrator, etc.) are built on general-purpose GNU/Linux distributions like Ubuntu,          
Debian, CentOS as well as other network software products. In this regard, one of the most                
important question is existence of zero-day and known vulnerabilities in the kernel of the              
operating system and in other its software modules. It was shown [9] that many of the                
SD-WAN products leak information related software versions (e.g., operating system,          
kernel, build versions). For instance, in February 2018, Shodan search engine detected            
Silver Peak appliances with the operating system based on unsupported and outdated            
Linux 2.6.38, released in March 2011 (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Linux kernel version leakage for Silver Peak products. 
 
Those vulnerabilities, in general, provide local facilities and can be employed by            
attackers to escalate privileges in the operating system. 
IPMI and Out of Band Management  
SD-WAN systems can be delivered as a hardware appliance using commercially available            
off-the-shelf (COTS) platforms. Modern server platforms support interfaces used by          
system administrators for out-of-band management of computer systems and monitoring of           
operations, such as Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI). Main risks of using            
the IPMI and Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs) are as follows [10]: 
● Passwords for IPMI authentication are saved in clear text. 
● Knowledge of an IPMI password gives you password for all computers in an IPMI              
managed group. 
● Root access on an IPMI system grants complete control over hardware, software,            
firmware on the system. 
● BMCs often run excess and older network services that may be vulnerable. 
● IPMI access may also grant a remote console access to the system, resulting in              
access to the BIOS. 
● There are few, if any, monitoring tools that are able to detect if the BMC is                
compromised. 
● The certain network flows to and from BMC are not encrypted. 
● Unclear documentation on how to sanitize IPMI passwords without destruction of           
the motherboard. 
 
Compromised BMC can be used by threat actors to establish persistence that lasts             
beyond an HDD wipe and reinstalling operating system. Attackers can use BMC trojans             
for lateral movement from host-side networks to management networks which are intended            
to be isolated. 
It is worth noting that update management mechanisms for IPMI components on            
OEM-platforms do not satisfy most of modern security requirements. For instance, Citrix            
CTX216642 update [11], published in September 2016, identified and fixed more than 30             
security vulnerabilities in Supermicro IPMI Lights Out Management (LOM); these          
vulnerabilities were known from May 2013.  
Basic Network Functions  
A NE performs packet processing functions and can be implemented as hardware,            
software, virtual, or cloud appliance. Cloud NE concept is used within Virtual Customer             
Premises Equipment (vCPE) or Cloud Customer Premises Equipment (cCPE) models in           
service delivering. 
 
 
Figure 5. SD-WAN Network Element with VNF support 
  
The following are the most important SD-WAN components used in East-West packet            
processing:  
● Packet Processor based on software implementing kernel bypass techniques         
(DPDK, PF_RING, OpenOnload, etc. PDK). 
● Routing based on traditional routing protocols (BGP, OSPF, RIP) and proprietary           
mechanisms like “SNMP Route Learning”. Open-source software like Quagga and          
Bird are generally used in routing components. 
● Overlay that involves running a logically separate network over traditional links           
using tunneling, encapsulation, and encryption methods. The overlay protocols also          
can be traditional (VXLAN, GRE, MPLS, etc. ) or proprietary. 
● VPN that is used to provide secure transport within overlay protocols. The            
strongSwan’s is the popular open-source implementation of IPsec used in most           
products. It is worth noting that strongSwan supports AH or ESP protocol, but             
AH+ESP bundle is not supported. At the same time many SD-WAN use custom             
cryptographic protocols, that automatically arise the set of cryptography related          
threats. 
The most important difference and peculiarity of SD-WAN packet processors from a            
security point of view is a necessity to consider threats targeting control plane via threats               
of management or orchestration plane. All explored SD-WAN products involved multiple           
web interfaces and generally an SQL database, that was shared between the services of              
different planes (management, control, forwarding, etc.). The same database generally          
stores information related to routing and forwarding, and, for instance, user interface,            
logging, statistic data. Network routes from the database are pushed to Routing            
Information Base and influence to Forwarding Information Base. For this reason, a            
vulnerability to SQL injection attack could allow an attacker to modify data in routing              
database, injects new routes and reroute network packets. It also means that in this case the                
attacker has given control under packet processor features implementing control flows           
from database to data plane features. 
As a result, a packet processor implementation vulnerabilities could arise the           
following main threats: 
● Using components with known vulnerabilities 
● Sensitive information disclosure 
● Arbitrary code execution 
● Denial of service 
● Network spoofing via ARP poisoning or ICMPv6 router advertisement attacks 
● Traffic rerouting 
● Poorly implemented data and control plane protocols 
For example, according to [12], on August 14th, 2018, Arista released information            
about a denial of service vulnerability where a crafted IP fragment ordering or overlap can               
allow an attacker to consume more memory than defined in the Linux kernel settings.  
Routing threats consist of target routing protocol (BGP, OSPF, etc.) well-known           
threats, such as BGP route leaking, route hijacking, and so on. It also includes reinvention               
routing mechanism product-specific threats. For instance, one of the SD-WAN products           
provided a SNMP route learning mechanism importing network routes from a remote            
router over SNMP v2c protocol. The security of this feature is based on SNMP community               
string strength and SNMP “requestID” randomness. So, it does not even implement a             
traditional integrity and authenticity mechanisms provided by all modern routing          
protocols. This mechanism must not be used within MitM attacker model: the SNMP             
community string mechanism cannot be used to protect routing information against           
modification; it enables protection against remote route spoofing attacks only. 
SD-WAN VPN threats extend employed cryptographic protocol (IPsec, TLS, DTLS,          
etc.) threat in the following sense. First, they involve general implementation related            
threats like control flow integrity, denial of service. Second, they involve threats to             
cryptographic protocols. For example, IPsec protocol commits the following threats: 
● Weak key and cryptographic parameter selection [13]. 
● Weak authentication, such as weak passwords for PSK or weak certificate or trust             
validation for RSA-based authentication. 
● Weak IKE parameters selection [14, 15]. 
● Specific implementation threats, such as Bleichenbacher-style signature forgery        
which involves RSA padding attack (CVE-2018-15836) [15]. 
Third, in addition, SD-WAN products often employ custom cryptographic solutions as           
they employ custom network protocols. For example [16], Citrix NetScaler SD-WAN           
appliances provide IPsec and proprietary “Global Virtual WAN Network Encryption”          
mechanism. In this regard, the following additional threats arise: 
● Poorly implemented cryptography mechanism 
● Insufficient cryptography protection 
● Customer identity disclosure 
● Use of insecure cryptographic algorithm 
● Peer impersonation 
Forth, VPN orchestration features are becoming most important since most SD-WAN           
products implement overlay mechanism based on encrypted tunnels with automatic          
configuration and cryptographic parameter agreement. Those mechanisms are responsible         
for cryptographic parameter and algorithms selection between communication entities.         
Having said this, most realistic attacks are downgrade attacks based on spoofing or MitM              
attacks on data plane, and insecure configuration related threats on control plane.  
It is recommended to apply the following security best practices to be protected against              
these threats: 
● Use standard cryptographic and network protocols 
● Update an operating system and third party components 
● Employ confinement mechanisms like SElinux and AppArmor 
● Use secure cryptographic parameters 
● Employ secure cryptographic primitives 
● Apply hardening-based mitigation methods 
● Develop internal mechanisms detecting network attacks 
Network Functions Virtualization  
Different approaches can be used to implement NFV mechanisms. These approaches           
include specialized VNF-aware applications within a base operating system and          
fully-featured hypervisor- or container-based virtualization mechanisms connected       
together in inline or passive modes in NFV environment. Given the fact, that a VNF               
processes transit packets, an intruder can attack forwarding, detection, or inspection           
engines on each VNF. For example, incorrect regular expressions in signature-based IDS            
(e.g., suricata) or WAF (e.g., modsecurity) can cause a vulnerability to Regular Expression             
Denial of Service attack. The example of this vulnerability is CVE-2017-15377 [17]. In the              
research, we identified a set of regular expression vulnerabilities in a SD-WAN product             
employing an “Emerging Threat” rule set. 
Beside that, each VNF has a bunch of control mechanisms (e.g., configuration            
management, logging, etc.). The corresponding interfaces, as usual, are available to control            
plane via southbound interfaces and employed by controller or orchestrator nodes. We            
were able to uncover a bunch of logical vulnerabilities related to improper authorization             
that could allow us to gain control over a VNF operating system. At the time of this                 
writing, the vulnerabilities are being fixed by corresponding vendor and we will disclose             
them in the next papers.  
A compromised VNF, in turn, can be considered as the source of threats targeting other               
SD-WAN components. Since a VNF and its components are connected together using            
TCP/IP stack, insufficient or improper VNF isolation and confinement can allow an            
attacker to commit a wide range of network attacks against the control and data plane of                
another VNF. The examples include password guessing, SSRF, DoS, traffic manipulation,           
memory corruption attacks, and so forth. 
As a rule, VNF is implemented on virtual machine or container. Accordingly, NFVI             
vulnerability may allow an attacker to escape from the confines of an affected virtual              
machine guest operating system and potentially obtain code-execution access to the host.            
Typical root cause examples involve vulnerabilities in virtualization mechanism         
implementation or configuration allowing an expanded access from a virtual machine           
guest to a host via different data exchange interfaces. For instance, the CVE-2015-3456             
describes a vulnerability in unnecessary floppy disk controller in QEMU that allows local             
guest users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and guest crash) or possibly               
execute arbitrary code [18]. In bare metal server, one of the actual threat is exploitation of                
vulnerabilities to Meltdown [19] and Spectre [20] attacks.  
We did not identify SD-WAN specific threats in NE and VNF management interface.             
These threats will be described in the corresponding section devoted to management plane             
threats. It should be noted, that vendors often use monitoring services (e.g., Munin) and              
apply insufficient security mechanisms to protect them. Generally, the services are bind to             
internal VNF network and accessible via the local interface (loopback interface) only. This             
approach is not sufficient in NFV architecture suggesting that several components with            
different trust level communicate with each other. As a result, threats regarding            
unauthorized access to a monitoring service and remote management (including operating           
system arbitrary command execution) can appear. 
We identified the following main threats here: 
● Denial of service via security function 
● Unauthorized access to VNF resources 
● Privilege escalation 
Figure 5 illustrates privilege escalation attack vectors targeting control and management           
planes within an SD-WAN NE. The first step (1) is to get unauthorized access to a VNF by                  
exploiting a vulnerability in Traffic Processing mechanism. Then the attacker can commit:            
an attack against an operating system (2), a horizontal privilege escalation attack against             
Traffic Processing mechanism of another VNF on the same NE(2’), or an vertical privilege              
escalation attack against management application on the same VNF (2’’). Having got            
access, the attacker can use a horizontal privilege escalation attack against management            
application of another VNF (3), attack NE management (3’), or attack VNF management             
mechanisms (3’’) from operating system layer. The last but not least here is a privilege               
escalation attack targeting of South - North communications exploiting control and           
management plane vulnerabilities of another SD-WAN nodes (4). 
 
 Figure 5. Privilege Escalation Attack Vectors Example 
 
We think the last attack vector is the most exploitable and probable; most of VNF               
communicate with controller using rich API and network protocols. Our experience shows            
that even those features in SD-WAN always contain implementation or operation security            
issues and can be exploited. 
Management Interfaces  
Management plane traditionally involves network protocols (e.g., SSH, TLS, HTTP),          
management interfaces (as usual, command line interface (CLI) and Web user interface            
(Web UI)), and software (Web browsers, Web servers, SSH clients, etc.). Despite that all              
best practices and security guides recommend not to connect management interfaces to the             
Internet and use them in out-of-band or logically separated networks, SD-WAN           
management interfaces, by design, are used not only to communicate with system            
administrators, but also with other SD-WAN components like orchestrator and controller.  
It was shown [9], that about 2 000 recognisable SD-WAN interfaces are connected on              
the Internet. Most of them are management interfaces. This result can be explained by              
moving SD-WAN to clouds and corresponding delivering SD-WAN via clouds such as            
AWS or Azure. 
Some SD-WAN features such as Zero Touch Provisioning and Multi-tenant          
Management should have access to the Internet via management interface by design. We             
will discuss this matter further. 
Management interfaces are divided into the following groups: 
1. Local and remote console (CLI). 
2. Human-machine web interfaces (Web UI). 
3. Machine to machine (Northbound and southbound interfaces) API. 
Command Line Interface 
CLI is used remotely and locally to interact with SD-WAN services. Most of them, as               
we have already known, employ GNU/Linux as a basic operating system thereby            
inheriting the general management mechanisms and tools like Telnet, SSH, command           
shells, and so on. In the most cases, restricted shell is used as a command shell. That shell                  
limits user abilities and only allows to perform a specified subset of system commands or a                
subset of high-level commands. Another approach is to provide a special restricted            
account. These approaches are traditionally considered as a common best practice, but            
their implementations often contain the following weaknesses: 
● Hardcoded accounts and passwords 
● Weak default passwords 
● A use of a special unlimited system user account that is able to access an operating                
system command shell directly 
● Permissive sudo configuration 
● Incorrect access control configuration 
● Vulnerabilities in GNU/Linux components (local privilege escalation) 
● Vulnerabilities in restricted shells 
The examples are as follows: 
● “_spsshell” command in Silver Peak allowing to access BASH shell directly [21] 
● “​CBVWSSH​” user account in Citrix NetScaler SD-WAN used by design to access            
debugging facilities 
● “admin” user account with predefined password in Cisco (Viptela) SD-WAN 
A use of SSH and Telnet protocols for remote management causes well-known threats.             
At the same time, it was found that some SD-WAN products additionally employ             
web-based tools like “AjaxTerm” and “Shell in a Box”. This extends an attack surface              
over web technologies and could allow an attacker to commit traditional Web attacks like              
DNS Rebinding, XSS, CSRF, Command Injection, and so on. Also, there are vendors             
(e.g., Viprinet) which use cleartext HTTP protocol without SSL/TLS. 
Web User Interface 
All explored SD-WAN products employ web user interface (Web UI) as a main unified              
interface to govern all parts of the SD-WAN system (routers, controller, orchestrator, etc.)             
over its data, control, management, and orchestration planes. 
It was found that existence of low-hanging critical vulnerabilities in SD-WAN related            
to Web UI is a widespread and systematic. We identified vulnerabilities to the following              
classic attacks: 
● HTTP Slow DoS-attacks 
● Password brute-forcing 
● XSS (Reflected, stored) 
● Command injection and RCE  
● XXE and SSRF 
● CSRF 
● IDOR 
For instance, the security bulletin [22] describes identified vulnerabilities in the Web UI             
of the Citrix SD-WAN physical appliances and virtual appliances. The vulnerabilities           
could allow an unauthenticated attacker having a network access to the management            
interface to compromise the entire SD-WAN network. 
The other widespread security issues identified in Web UI are sensitive information            
leakage and vulnerabilities to SSRF. First, most of SD-WAN products provide logging            
facilities enabled by default. They often leak sensitive information such as user passwords             
and session tokens into world-readable files. These leakages can cause unauthorized access            
or privilege escalations. Second, since SD-WAN involves a set of interconnected network            
services and applications, from our point of view, a vulnerability to SSRF attack is one of                
the most critical vulnerabilities. SD-WAN services, as usual, belong to the same trust             
domain and an ability to send requests behalf on such services could allow an attacker to                
bypass authorization mechanisms and gain access to critical services like REST API (see             
the examples in the Network Functions Virtualization Threats section).  
Multi-tenancy 
An SD-WAN system is called multi-tenant, if it has an ability to provide logical isolation               
of shared resources within NFV concept. This suggests an existence of common Web UI              
used by different tenants to access isolated SD-WAN instances. It turned out that those              
Web UI also have web security vulnerabilities specific to multi-tenant applications such as             
missing or improper access control. In this context, it is worth noting that an adversary               
having a legitimate access to the management interface can commit threats against a             
provider or other clients (tenants). For example, standard or weak passwords for different             
tenants or weak password recovery mechanism can lead to horizontal privilege escalation.            
In this regard, the adversary can examine implementation and its possible weaknesses            
using an own isolated session and then exploit found vulnerabilities against other clients. 
During the research, the following main threats regarding multi-tenancy were identified: 
● Unauthorized access to provider’s data 
● Unauthorized access to tenant’s data 
● Unauthorized access to tenant’s VNF 
● Unauthorized access to tenant’s stored flow data (e.g., NetFlow, IPFIX) 
● Denial of Service 
The following threats are most actual regarding management plane: 
● Unauthorized access to management interface on the Internet 
● Enumeration and fingerprinting SD-WAN nodes on the Internet 
● Exhaustive Denial of Service 
● Privilege escalation 
● Insufficient authentication 
● Insufficient access control 
● Local or remote privilege escalation within operating system access control 
The following common recommendations can be made to protect management: 
● Do not use default passwords 
● Apply secure provisioning during an initial configuration of a node 
● Network service confinement and isolation 
● Input validation and output escaping for data crossing trust level boundary 
● Systematically update own and third-party software components 
● Correctly configure TLS protocol 
● Apply secure software development lifecycle practices 
● Employ embedded WAF mechanisms as defence in depth mechanism protecting          
Web UI 
● Harden an operating system components 
Orchestration Services  
Service Interfaces 
Northbound interface is used to interface with orchestration layer. As a rule, SD-WAN             
vendors prefer to employ REST API, XML-based, or custom protocols. Most used            
protocols are HTTP or Websocket.  
Southbound interface is used by controllers to communicate with to communicate with            
routers. In general, SD-WAN employs Openflow, NETCONF, REST API, or custom           
protocols over TLS to program the network connectivity and GRE, VXLAN to provide             
overlay tunnels. 
The main common threats which are most critical to our opinion and were identified in               
the research include the following: 
● Unauthorized access to a dangerous method or function via exposed interface 
● Unauthorized access to operating system resource via vulnerable functions or          
methods 
● SD-WAN node (edge router, controller, orchestrator) spoofing 
● Sensitive information exposure 
● Eavesdropping 
Let’s consider the most critical vulnerability we managed to identify within the research             
in the context of interface threats. We found a use of hard-coded TLS certificate and the                
corresponding public-key cryptography key pair in a well-known SD-WAN product (at the            
time of writing this vulnerability has not been fixed yet). It turned out that all SD-WAN                
controllers and orchestrators of this vendor use the same pre-installed self-signed RSA            
certificate in a controller - orchestrator communication protocol. An attacker in passive            
MitM position could use the certificate and corresponding private key to perform            
eavesdropping and spoofing attacks against all SD-WAN nodes. Using this vulnerability           
the attacker can commit all above threats. 
In another case, a vendor used Websocket-based protocol to implement a Northbound            
interface. The implementation were vulnerable to Cross-Site Websocket Hijacking attack,          
As a result, an authenticated remote attacker could perform arbitrary command on a edge              
router. 
 Zero Touch Provisioning 
Zero Touch Provisioning (ZTP) or Zero Time Deployment (ZTD) is a mechanism that             
allows nodes to be provisioned and configured automatically. For example, Citrix           
SD-WAN ZTD mechanism enables an SD-WAN appliance to communicate with Citrix           
ZTD Cloud Service that is publicly accessible from any point on the Internet using              
management interface [23].  
 
 
Figure 6. Citrix ZTD High-Level Architecture. 
It is obvious, that in that case authentication and authorization mechanisms of ZTP             
service are critical elements of SD-WAN security. For example, CVE-2018-0434 [24]           
describes a critical vulnerability in Cisco SD-WAN Zero Touch Provisioning feature that            
could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive            
data by using an invalid certificate. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by             
supplying a crafted certificate to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the              
attacker in MitM position to decrypt confidential information between SD-WAN device           
and ZTP service. 
Often, ZTP services are implemented as Web services and contain typical           
vulnerabilities to attacks such as SQL Injection, OS Command Injection, SSRF, and so on.  
At the same time, by design, ZTP server must accept requests from unidentified and              
unauthenticated devices on the Internet. This fact increases attack surface and attacker            
capabilities. As an example, let’s consider a vulnerability CVE-2018-0347 [25] that could            
allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with             
root privileges. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to execute commands with             
root privileges. It should be noted that in this case, an attacker must be authenticated to                
access the vulnerable functionality. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. We            
identified a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to inject            
arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. 
So, the following threats can be encountered regarding ZTP: 
● ZTP server or/and client spoofing 
● Unauthorized access to ZTD service and data in cloud 
● Exhaustive Denial of Service on cloud ZTP service 
● Privilege escalation on ZTP server 
● Eavesdropping 
● Insufficient access control in multi-tenant ZTD service 
Cryptography Threats 
All known SDN/SD-WAN architecture and reference design guides [6, 7] do not mention             
a cryptography plane. At the same time cryptographic mechanisms must be employed and             
employed correctly and secure on all planes: data, control, management, and orchestration            
(application). Cryptographic mechanisms are essense of SDN/SD-WAN. 
In cryptography, it is known two informal rules. The first, the gold rule: “Do not               
develop your own crypto”. And the second one, the silver rule: “Do not implement              
well-known crypto primitives”. Unfortunately, the current state of practical SD-WAN          
products adds a new rule: “Do not provision your crypto”. We found that most of               
SD-WAN products (fortunately not all) have the following flaws related to cryptographic            
provisioning: 
● Use of hardcoded public-key cryptography key pairs and corresponding certificates          
that are the same for all customers and can not be replaced 
● Use of self-signed certificates for generated public-key cryptography key pairs          
issued by the SD-WAN product 
● Manual installation of self-signed certificates on SD-WAN nodes with no chance to            
fast revoke them 
● Absence of classic CRL and OCSP mechanisms 
● Absence of interfaces to be integrated with customer private or public CA 
We also were surprised that no explored SD-WAN product uses modern promising            
cryptographic features, frameworks, mechanisms and tools such as short-lived certificates,          
Noise, NoiseSocket, Strobe, Disco, WireGuard, SPIFFE. We do not suggest to use them on              
data plane, but we think that cryptographic primitives are very useful and suitable for              
cloud-centric applications, northbound, and southbound interfaces.  
 
4    CONCLUSIONS 
In the paper, we provided and explained most common SD-WAN threats observed through             
SD-WAN threat modelling and security assessment campaign. 
This allowed us to discover many zero-day vulnerabilities in different commercial            
products. The security assessment was oriented to general security mechanisms and Web            
interfaces.  
The following summarized security issues were identified: 
● Silver Peak Unity EdgeConnect [20] 
○ Lack of protection against brute-forcing password 
○ Web UI leaks software versions 
○ Lack of protection against CSRF for REST API 
○ Denial of service of Web UI via Slow HTTP attacks 
○ REST API leaks software versions 
○ Use of default SNMP community strings 
○ Access to operating system interface via administrative CLI backdoor 
○ Multiple vulnerabilities to reflected XSS 
○ Arbitrary file reading via path traversal 
● Riverbed SteelConnect [26] 
○ Password reset link spoofing via HTTP host header 
○ Stored XSS via user name field 
○ Denial of service of gateway via slow HTTP attacks 
● Cisco (Viptela) SD-WAN 
○ OpenSSH leaks system version via warning message 
○ Incorrect protection against CSRF for REST API and Web UI 
● Viprinet Virtual VPN Hub 
○ Stored XSS in CLI via item names 
○ TLS server vulnerable to ROBOT attack 
● Citrix NetScaler SD-WAN [22] 
○ Denial of Service on Web UI via Slow HTTP attacks 
○ Multiple stored and reflected XSS 
○ Lack of protection against CSRF for REST API and Web UI 
○ Absence of function level access control mechanism 
○ Multiple command injections 
○ Multiple SQL injections 
○ Arbitrary file reading via path traversal 
○ Unauthorized access to Munin web UI 
All these issues were reported to corresponding vendors. Some issues were disclosed            
via “Full Disclosure Mailing List” [26]. 
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